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Short summary 
(extended summary at the end) 
 
A short description of  the relationship between Physics, Philosophy and Theology is: Physics 
neglects or passes by Natural Realism, which is the origin of  Philosophy. In turn, Natural 
Realism is backed up by Judeo-Christian revelation. Therefore, Physics neglects or passes 
by Theology. 
 
That present relationship between Physics and Theology is widely used as a background for 
exercising an intense pressure on Theology. 
 
The defence of Theology should begin by pointing out certain shortcomings of  Physics and 
formulating a philosophical control of  these shortcomings. This is tantamount to declaring 
Physics instead of Theology a “site under construction”. Only a “controlled” Physics and 
Theology could become adequate discussion partners. 
 
The author of  this article is a Catholic, * 1947, PhD in Theoretical Physics, since 1981 catholic 
priest, working in the Diocese of  Helsinki, Finland. However, the ideas expressed are, by and 
large, acceptable for Orthodox and Lutheran Christians as well, with possible dif ferences only 
regarding natural theology. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Most probably, the first reaction to the title ‘Why is it not so easy for a present-day 
physicist to be genuinely a Christian?’ is bewilderment or disconcert. One might rather 
think that the beautiful laws of nature discovered by physicists, together with their success 
in describing natural processes, should help their discoverers to notice the creative mind 
that shines up in them. In fact, the observed order and intelligibility of nature give rise to a 
classical and, so to speak very popular, argument for the Creator. In St. Thomas Aquinas’s 
account of cosmological arguments for the existence of the Creator, this argument is 
called quinta via. 
 
But, as a sociological fact, physicists are not inclined to notice the creative mind in the 
laws of nature, and certainly not motivated by their professional education and work. 
Rather, many physicists are atheists or agnostics. And many people, who have been 
raised in a Christian family, no matter whether Catholic, Orthodox or Lutheran, have 
become estranged from the faith of their youth without becoming declared atheists or 
agnostics, precisely because of exercising their profession as physicists1. Here is an 
incomplete list with the names of some well-known physicists and their religious affiliation. 
Only very few first-line physicists are declared Christians, including Pascual Jordan 2, Max 
Planck and Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker; all of them Lutherans. Some others relate 
friendly towards Christianity, such as Max Born and Werner Heisenberg. There is a certain  
number of second-line physicists who declare themselves Christians, mainly evangelical or 
Lutheran, above all in the US. Second-line physicists who declare themselves Catholics, 
are not so frequent, such as Stephen Barr, University of Delaware, co-founder of the US-
based Society of Catholic Scientists (SCS, 2016)3. Similarly Michael B. Dennin, University 
of California - Irvine4. Quite a few first-line physicists are declared atheists including, but 
not limited to, Niels Bohr, Max Delbrück, Paul Dirac, Albert Einstein, Richard Feynman, 
Peter Higgs, Stephen Hawking, Carlo Rovelli, Erwin Schrödinger and Steven Weinberg. 
 
It seems that the quinta via “does not work” any longer. Physics and other natural sciences 
seem to have replaced Religion. In other words, the cathedrals of our time are not any 
more the real cathedrals of St. Peter, or St. John in Lateran, or St. Mary, or St. James, or 
Christ the Saviour. The names of the contemporary cathedrals are CERN in Geneva, 
DESY in Hamburg, DUBNA in Moscow, almost all university hospitals, Enrico Fermi-
Laboratory in Chicago, Jacques Monod-Institute of Fundamental Biology in Paris, Albert 
Einstein-Institute for Gravitational Physics in Hannover/Potsdam, and so on. 
 
As to Biology, suffice it to say that the dominant spirit in almost all university departments 
of Biology is materialistic, and as such opposed to any religious belief. To the spirit 
dominant in natural sciences, one has to add their influence in the life of society. The 
technological results of the natural sciences, their influence on economy, finances and 
politics make them a focus of public interest. Therefore, it is understandable that in almost 
every country exist journals for the popularization of science such as “Scientific American ”  
and “Science” in the US and their translations into other languages. There are also TV-
series such as “BBC-CrowdScience”, and on many products one can find a remark like 
“scientifically tested”. In comparison to that, initiatives for the “popularization of Religion” 
have great difficulties. It is not at all exaggerated to say that our western civilization is 
 
1 The labels ’Christian’ and ’Atheist’ have a great bandwidth, but sources like the following might stil l give a certain 
orientation: the Notable Names Database www.nndb.com, and in Wikipedia, ”list of Christians in Science and 
Technology”, ”list of atheists in science and technology”, ”list of Christian philosophers”, ”list of atheist philosophers”. 
2 Jordan, Pascual, Der Naturwissenschaftler vor der religiösen Frage, Stalling-Verlag, Oldenburg, 51968. Additionally, 
several articles on similar topics. 
3 Barr, Stephen M., Modern Physics and Ancient Faith, University of Notre Dame Press, 12003, 22016. Also: The 
Believing Scientist. Essays on Science and Religion. Eerdmans Publishers, 2016. 
4 Dennin, Michael B., Divine Science. Finding Reason at the Heart of Faith, Franciscanmedia, 2015. Frequent talks in TV 
etc. 
more and more a scientific-technological one and lesser and lesser a philosophical-
religious one. 
 
After this first overview, let us define our way to answer the question ‘Why is it not so easy 
for a present-day physicist to be genuinely a Christian?’ The first step consists in confining 
ourselves to Physics. The second step of defining our way to answer the question is to not 
focus on persons and their convictions, but on doctrines and their mutual harmony or lack 
of harmony. That means for the answer to ou r main question “Why is it not so easy for a 
present-day physicist to be genuinely a Christian?” that we disregard personal attitudes, 
which might have grown out of personal life circumstances. We are looking for a non-
individual, theoretical reason, why it is not so easy ... . In fact, the focusing on doctrines 
makes it easier to single out precisely one aspect in which both branches of knowledge – 
Physics and Catholic Theology - should be in harmony with each other. The fact is that 
they are not. Accordingly, an individual physicist would have to host in his mind two 
doctrines that are somehow opposed. So, we will focus on the question, why Physics and 
Catholic theology are not in harmony in the area, where they should be. 
 
Focusing on doctrines and their relationship means also that the particular physical 
problems are only important insofar they substantiate the methodology of Physics in a 
particular case. Therefore, the theory of Big-Bang, the question of the age of the Universe, 
the age of the Earth, the formation of galaxies and our planetary system, and others are 
secondary. Likewise, comparisons with particular statements of the Bible, such as the 
details of the Flood, are of no interest in our context. Historical questions like the Galilei-
affair are likewise irrelevant. Our task is really centered on the present day state of 
doctrines and their methodological properties. 
 
The third and last step of defining the way of answering our question is to determine 
where precisely Physics and Catholic Theology should be in harmony. (Please remember: 
what will be said here in the name of Catholic Theology, is acceptable, with the possible 
exception of natural theology, for Orthodox and Lutheran Theology as well.) Now, the point 
of harmony cannot be God, for Physics does not speak about God. The point of harmony 
cannot be either the particular laws of nature, for Theology does not deal with them. Yet, 
Theology speaks about the things of our world in a way that can be labeled as ‘common 
sense’ plus the concept of creating. ‘Creating’ lies outside our experience, but it is linked to 
Common Sense by precisely the way of reasoning that is called ‘natural theology’. 
 
A more philosophical name for ‘common sense’ is ‘Natural Realism’. It refers to the way of 
thinking that can be found everywhere throughout antiquity until the h igh Middle Ages. 
Thereafter it is confined to those philosophical traditions which have maintained that way 
of thinking such as Aristotelians, Thomists, also a certain group of Phenomenologists, to 
mention but the main currents. On the other hand, Rationalists and Empiricists, Kantians 
and most Analytic philosophers would group themselves more or less apart from Natural 
Realism. 
 
In the following we explain the relevant details of dealing with the material things of our 
world, as is done in Physics. Taking into account that Physics has grown out from the 
antique philosophy of nature, which in turn is part of Natural Realism, we outline also the 
basic features of Natural Realism. Then we examine briefly also the Catholic view of 
how Christian revelation speaks about material things (II.). In a nutshell, the result will 
be that the mindset of Physics is not in harmony with that of Natural Realism, meanwhile 
the mindset of Natural Realism is in harmony with the mindset in Catholic Theology, when  
the latter speaks about our material world. This means that we have already answered 
somehow the initial question of “Why is it not so easy for a present-day physicist to be 
genuinely a Christian?” 
 
But we have to take into account another fact not yet mentioned: there is a pressure on 
Theology, understood as a discipline that expounds Christian revelation. That pressu re is 
exercised by people who seem to be convinced that Science has the stronger arguments 
(III.). Such a pressure is unjustifiable and we have also to consider, therefore, what can 
be done in order to diminish that pressure. It turns out that this task must be, and can 
be, carried out in the mindset of Natural Realism. The result is a philosophical control of 
the methodical losses of Physics performed in order to match material things with 
mathematical models. This is a substantial contribution to bringing Physics back into 
harmony with Theology (IV.), so that only a Physics equipped with that control can be 
an adequate discussion partner for Theology. 
 
 
II. State of affairs: Physics, Philosophy, Theology 
 
PHYSICS. In our context, the key words are success, model and reductionism. The 
success of Physics is known to everybody: from the simplest machines like balances and 
carriages to computers, telephones, nanotechnology and heavy industries, cars, ships, 
aeroplanes and spaceships. It is quite understandable that many people are fascinated by 
such achievements. Accordingly, it is understandable that a whole civilization is built on 
technology which, in turn, is based on science. Therefore, industry, economy, even military 
defence have deeply shaped our mindset. 
 
On a more directly scientific level, there should be mentioned the two great theories of the 
20th century: the theories of Special and General Relativity, on the one hand, and the 
Quantum theory, on the other. Here are some key words that accompany these theories: 
the equivalence of mass and energy, which is at the root of atomic bombs (by both fission 
and fusion), the equivalence of heavy and inert mass, gravitational waves, for the theories 
of Relativity. And for Quantum theory, atomic spectra, superconductivity and suprafluidity, 
elementary particles and their so called electromagnetic, weak and strong interactions. 
The chain of successes can be expected to continue. 
 
What is the key to such successes? The answer consists in one concept expressed in two 
words: mathematical models. Here we have united in one concept both the greatness and 
the limitation of Physics. The greatness has just been sketched by some successes. Let 
me illustrate, by means of the definition of model, the limitation. The definition of model 
stems from the physicist Heinrich Hertz (1857-1894), who could even be called the father 
of the concept ‘model’. He relates external objects and certain mental (internal) images 
and imposes furthermore a certain condition on those images. He wrote his definition 
about 120 years ago, but the central idea continues also nowadays being the same: 
 
“The most direct, and in a sense the most important, problem which our conscious 
knowledge of nature should enable us to solve is the anticipation of future events, so that we 
may arrange our present affairs in accordance with such anticipation. … In endeavouring 
thus to draw inferences as to the future from the past, we always adopt the following 
process. We form for ourselves images [innere Scheinbilder] or symbols of external objects; 
and the form which we give them is such that 
 
- now comes the first key passage - 
 
the necessary consequents of the images in thought are always the images of the necessary 
consequents in nature of the things pictured.” 5 (italics are mine) 
 
Here we have clearly expressed the motivation for making models: to predict events or 
processes. And to predict not just in order to know, but in order to be able to act now in 
prevision of what is going to happen later. It is this what makes possible machines, 
because if future events can be controlled by making suitable arrangements in the presen t 
moment, you can let the process doing its work “alone”, because you already know the 
result. In other words, the most interesting property of Physics is, in Hertz’s eyes, that it 
can produce practical results, not just knowledge. After having introduced the notion of 
model, he goes on mentioning some of their properties, among others the following: 
 
“… The images which we here speak of are our conceptions of things. With the things 
themselves they are in conformity in one important respect, namely, in satisfying the above-
mentioned, requirement. For our purpose it is not necessary that they should be in conformity 
with the things in any other respect whatever. As a matter of fact, we do not know, nor have 
we any means of knowing, whether our conceptions of things are in conformity with them in 
any other than this one fundamental respect. … 
 
- And here comes the second key passage - 
 
The images which we may form of things are not determined without ambiguity by the 
requirement that the consequents of the images must be the images of the consequents.” 
(Italics are mine)6 
 
Altogether, physical models are considered to be not uniquely determined by the material 
reality they are supposed to picture. Therefore, they also reflect the genius of the model 
maker and not only the reality of the material th ings involved. The model of a process is 
successful in the sense that it predicts the development of that process. 
 
Even though Hertz does not mention it, the experimental practice shows without exception  
that prediction is possible only up to a relative precision. This relative precision can be 
good, high or even excellent. ‘Relatively precise’ can mean ‘exact with a margin of 2% 
deviation’, or of 0,2% deviation, or of 0,02% deviation – but of a deviation anyway. Relative 
precision can vary over a range and, thus, is not identical with truth. A model’s success 
might be true, but that does not mean that the model is true. The reason is that it does not 
make sense to say that a model is ‘more or less true’ or ‘true within certain margins’. 
 
The bifurcation between truth and success (allowing for little deviations) makes that 
understanding a model is not the same as understanding the corresponding natural things. 
It is not possible to substitute success for truth or vice versa. Instead of one criterion for 
judging a discourse in Physics, one has now two criteria which never coincide. Because 
of that gap, the epistemological climate of Physics becomes “foggy” or even dark. It can 
only be brightened up when one achieves an understanding of the link between natural 
things and the pertinent model that goes beyond the category of success. 
 
 
5 Hertz, Heinrich. The Principles of Mechanics Presented in a New Form. London. McMillan, 1899, p.1. 
6 Hertz, Heinrich. The Principles of Mechanics Presented in a New Form. London. McMillan, 1899, p.2. 
To the “darkening of the epistemological climate” of physics exists another contribution 
that stems from abstractions, idealizations and simplifications. They are very often carried 
out in order to make the models manageable in a practical way. It is the declared intention 
to leave the "main effect" untouched, the latter being judged according to the rules of art, 
from the perspective of existing models. Of course, this does not change the reality 
experienced, but only the model from the physicist’s side. In other words, the reality is 
independent of the model. Nevertheless, the abstractions, idealizations and simplifications 
make that the full reality must be described with fewer elements. The incompleteness 
emerging here may then be bridged by hypotheses. Precisely this is the additional 
darkening of the epistemological climate. 
 
The idea of making models is not only supported by the desire of being able to arrange our 
present affairs in accordance with a model that anticipates the consequences of present 
actions. The philosophical tradition shaped by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), in particular 
its epistemological aspects, is very likely to have supported the making of models, 
because it claims that knowledge of natural things stems, by and large, from man himself. 
In order to substantiate that, we need only recall some key quotations from Kant’s Critique 
of pure reason: 
 
“Although all our knowledge begins with experience, that doesn’t mean that it all comes from 
experience.”7 For "[t]he order and regularity in appearances, which we call Nature, are put 
there by ourselves. We could never find them in appearances if it weren’t that we, or the 
nature of our mind, had first put them there."8 
 
And a little bit later, another reference to the copernican turn:  
 
“Even though it might seem counterintuitive, the understanding isn’t a mere power of 
formulating rules through comparison of appearances; it is itself the lawgiver of Nature. It’s 
only through the understanding that Nature exists at all! …. Nature is the synthetic unity of 
the manifold of appearances according to rules. And appearances can’t exist outside us—
they exist only in our sensibility. Thus, Nature … is possible only in the unity of self -
awareness.”9 
 
In fact, it is known from Hertz’s diaries that he was an avid reader of Kant’s writings. The 
same is true with respect to Einstein. Therefore, it is likely that their views in Physics were 
influenced by Kant’s thinking. It is not surprising, then, that the epistemological climate in 
Physics in general has become increasingly Kantian. This leads to a sort of exchange of 
roles: it is not any more the real world only that determines the properties of the model, but 
it is the model that increasingly determines what the real material world should be like. The 
genius of the model maker becomes more and more important. 
 
This change is reflected in the concept of ‘theory-ladenness of experience’ which, in our 
context, can be characterized by saying that the experiences or observations are affected 
by the theories held by the observer or experimenter. This idea – although not the word - is 
contained in the following text, written by Karl Popper (1902-1994) in 1935: 
 
 
7 I. K a n t . Critique of pure Reason (2. edition, 1787), www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/kant1781part1.pdf, margin 
number 1. 
8 I. K a n t . Critique of pure Reason (first edition, 1781), www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/kant1781part1.pdf, 
marginal number A125. 
9 I. K a n t . Critique of pure Reason (first edition, 1781), www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/kant1781part1.pdf, 
marginal number A127. 
”Even the careful and sober testing of  our ideas by experience is in its turn inspired by ideas: 
experiment is planned action in which every step is guided by theory. We do not stumble 
upon our experiences, nor do we let them flow over us like a stream. Rather, we have to be 
active: we have to ‘make’ our experiences. It is we who always formulate the questions to be 
put to nature; it is we who try again and again to put these questions so as to elicit a clear-cut 
‘yes’ or ‘no’ (for nature does not give an answer unless pressed for it). And in the end, it is 
again we who give the answer, it is we ourselves who, after severe scrutiny, decide upon the 
answer to the question we put to nature”10. 
 
A contemporary voice confirms that the idea of theory-ladenness of experiences continues 
being influential. The following passages stem from Stephen Hawking (1942-2018) and 
represent, by and large, the mindset of the overwhelming majority of physicists. The two 
first paragraphs show, how models might carry the model maker from the observed “real 
reality” away to a theory-shaped reality, i.e. to theory-laden observations. The last 
sentence shows that it is only a small step from the theory-ladenness of observations to 
the theory-createdness of observations: 
 
"There is no picture- or theory-independent concept of reality. Instead we adopt a view that 
we call model-dependent realism: the idea that a physical theory or world picture is a model 
(generally of a mathematical nature) and a set of rules that connect the elements of the 
model to observations ...” 11 
 
”According to the idea of model-dependent realism … our brains interpret the input from our 
sensory organs by making a model of the outside world. We form mental concepts of our 
home, trees, other people, the electricity that flows from wall sockets, atoms, molecules, and 
other universes. These mental concepts are the only reality we can know. There is no model-
independent test of reality. It follows that a well-constructed model creates a reality of its 
own." 12 
 
“Your reality depends on the model you employ” 13 
 
Now, if models were only meant to construct machines or bring about other products of 
engineering, the ranking of success before mere knowledge would be perfectly legitimate. 
It is really astonishing how successful this method work, even after all the severe 
interventions of the physicist, which we have pinpointed so far with the concepts of 
success and model. Some explanations about reductionisms will follow in due course. 
Engineering and Creation are not at all at odds; on the contrary, the manifest reality of 
engineering convincingly show, how well the Creator has formed material things and the 
genius of the human mind. That situation would not only be compatible with, but part of 
Common Sense or Natural Realism. In fact, the first passage of Hertz quoted seems to 
point precisely to that direction (of practical possibilities). However, the second passage of 
Hertz quoted reflect clearly the skepticism inherited by Kant and, therefore, seems to claim 
that natural things are just precisely that what the model says they are. 
 
 
10 Popper, Karl R. The Logic of Scientific Discovery, p. 280. Hutchinson & Co. 11959, Routledge (Routledge Classics), 
London 32002. 
11 Hawking, Stephen; Mlodinow, Leonid, The Grand Design – A New Explanation of the Universe, New York, Bantam 
Books, 2010. p. 42. 
12 Hawking, Stephen; Mlodinow, Leonid, The Grand Design – A New Explanation of the Universe, New York, Bantam 
Books, 2010. p. 172. 
13 Hawking, Stephen; Mlodinow, Leonid, The Grand Design – A New Explanation of the Universe, New York, Bantam 
Books, 2010. p. 175. 
In other words, if the models are claimed to tell how things really are, then it is obvious that 
the question is not about engineering, but about man’s relationship to reality at all. And this 
is a philosophical stance. Therefore, it is necessary to sharply distinguish between the 
point of view of engineering, on the one hand, and of philosophy, on the other. As a matter 
of fact, the dominating mindset among physicists and in society in general is inclining to 
conflate or mix the engineering stance with the philosophical one and say: Because a 
model is successful, it must be true. This opinion is not limited to professional physicists, 
but spreads through school education and the many programmes for the popularization  of 
science to all members of society. However, such a mindset has little to do with Common 
Sense. 
 
Now, what about reductionisms, which is the third key word in the context of the 
intellectual climate of Physics? Here, the practical character of Physics plays a dominant 
role, because reductionisms determine, above all, the performing of experiments. Physics 
relies on experiments in order to substantiate the success of a model. At the same time, 
the design of experiments needs more and more sophisticated models. Here we have a 
sort of self-consistent circle, where theoretical and practical elements form an inseparable 
amalgam. The history of Physics shows that such a self-consistent circle is rather stable, 
while compatible with development and even major “paradigm shifts”. But not even such 
“paradigm shifts” have substantially altered that being interwoven of theory and 
experiment, so that it seems almost impossible to leave that circle of self-consistency and 
to attempt a sort of internal reform of Physics. 
 
In all branches of Physics, the experimenter shapes, in six intertwined ways, the 
performance of an experiment: 
 
(i) The experimenter chooses two material things. By doing so, he gives them a 
preferential position with respect to the rest of the world. At the same time, he assigns 
them the functions ‘object’ and ‘experimental apparatus’ in an experiment to be carried 
out by him. In doing so, he chooses between two alternatives by determining which of 
the two sides should be considered the object and which the apparatus. The two 
possible attributions of ‘object/apparatus’ to the two sides exclude each other, in the 
same experimental process. Neither the categories ‘object’ and ‘apparatus’ nor the 
subsequent choice of one of the two alternatives have a foundation in nature. They 
have their exclusive roots in the interests of the experimenter-investigator; 
 
(ii) The experimenter puts spatial limits to experiments, even though their real connection 
with the rest of the world continues unaltered. But that real connection gets lost in the 
theory; 
 
(iii) The experimenter stops his intervention by his own initiative. Only this makes possible a 
result, though at the expenses of separating it from the “ongoing flow of nature”; 
 
(iv) The experimenter mentally isolates part of the experiment from the whole, i.e. the 
result, by abstracting from the process the termination of which brings about that result. 
Exceptions are instantaneous processes (particle decays and -reactions), because 
there the process is identical with its result; 
 
(v) The experimenter almost entirely abstracts from the apparatus after having used it by 
attributing the result to the object only instead of equally to both sides. This has no 
foundation in nature, but exclusively in the experimenter-investigator’s interests; 
 
(vi) The experimenter weakens the relevance of the observations concomitant to the 
experiment and often replaces experiences by results of experiments (e.g., the colours 
seen by wave lengths measured). Through the concomitant observations, it is known 
that the reductionisms (i) – (v) are precisely this: reductionisms. 
 
None of the experimenter’s six interventions corresponds to anything in nature. The results 
of investigation obtained under such conditions do not refer to the true nature, but rather to 
its reductionist picture. The reductionist picture is successful, but not true, rather a lack of 
truth. In a nutshell: the major part of abstractions and rearrangements consists in 
(a) mentally cutting off the two sides of an experiment from the “rest of the world” and 
(b) abstracting from the apparatus after having read off a result and attributed it to the 
object alone. This unequal treatment is an infraction of the equal situation of both object 
and apparatus in reality. At first sight, the six interventions seem to add something to the 
true picture of nature. But in reality, all these interventions cause losses in the knowledge 
of material reality. They give rise to section IV, which addresses the question of how these 
losses can be somehow controlled. 
 
The influence of the key words success, model and reductionism on the intellectual 
physiognomy of Physics can be summarized as follows: 
 
(i) Physics is not aiming at truth, but at success. Truth and success are not identical. 
Nevertheless, the success is a true one. 
 
(ii) In order to achieve that success, Physics does not focus on real material things, but 
fabricates abstract models of those material things. Such models are not uniquely 
determined and, thus, more or less hypothetical. Additionally, these models abstract 
from the major part of reality in order to investigate the remains. Furthermore, they use 
to make major simplifications. These abstractions and simplifications are losses for the 
pretended knowledge of material realities, i.e. they make impossible to achieve a full 
knowledge of what material things are and why and how they behave as they do. In 
other words, they are reductionisms. 
 
(iii) The hypothetical character of those models as well as their lack of correspondence to 
the material reality prepares the way for an ever increasing skepticism. 
 
The success of the reductionisms might easily make this assessment look too negative. 
But precisely the success is obtained at the expenses of truth, and it is not at all proven 
whether renouncing of the reductionisms would not yield the same, if not more, success. 
As has already been mentioned in the preview, Physics has grown out from the old 
philosophy of nature, which in turn “moves” with in Natural Realism. This is why we are 
going to outline also the basic features of 
 
NATURAL REALISM. Representatives of Natural Realism are Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, 
and their disciples through the centuries. One should leave aside, however, those who cal l  
themselves either transcendental or analytical Aristotelians and Thomists. The reason is, 
to my mind that, on the one hand, transcendental philosophers like Kant have made a 
“critical turn” away from natural Realism. On the other hand, analytical philosophers have 
made what they call a “linguistic turn” which, by and large, passes by sense experience 
without ruling it out by seeing thought and language in a tigh t parallel: 
 
”The basic tenet of analytical philosophy, common to such disparate philosophers as Schlick, 
early and late Wittgenstein, Carnap, Ryle, Ayer, Austin, Quine and Davidson, may be 
expressed as being that the philosophy of thought is to be equated with the philosophy of 
language; more exactly: (i) an account of language does not presuppose an account of 
thought, (ii) an account of language yields an account of thought, and (iii) there is no other 
adequate means by which an account of thought may be given.”14  
 
It is important to note that Natural Realism is more comprehensive than any particu lar 
consistently formulated building of metaphysical thought, like what we encounter in 
Aristotle’s thought of the metaphysical categories of substance and accidents, and the 
principles of act and potency that are “operative”, for instance, in the hylomorphic structure 
of material things. Or what we encounter in  the thought of Thomas Aquinas, who 
formulated a sort of synthesis of the Aristotelian metaphysical view with the notion of 
participation inspired by Plato. 
 
Conversely, Natural Realism cannot be defined by placing it into a even more 
comprehensive category of human knowledge. The reason simply is, that Natural Reali sm 
itself does not exclude any sector of human knowledge. Accordingly, Natural Realism can  
be described somehow by saying that it does not put any preliminary condition to 
philosophical inquiry and is careful to not leave out anything that comes before the mind’s 
eyes. 
 
There are many philosophers, who follow, to one degree or another, the spirit of Natural 
Realism. Perhaps the most important reason for this is that a person normally is brought 
up in the mindset of Natural Realism without his parents need to make any decision to do 
so. That is to say that Natural Realism is not just one philosophical position besides others 
that can be chosen from a philosophical no mans land. It has a priority, not only in a 
temporal sense, but also in the sense of being present in any philosophical position. Even  
if somebody turns away from this connatural intellectual stance, her or she must decide to 
do so and, despite of that, can never completely leave Natural Realism. The philosopher 
Nicolai Hartmann (1882 (Riga) – 1950 (Göttingen)) is an example, insofar he adhered 
during the first part of his philosophical career the Neo-Kantian school of Marburg, but then 
left it in order to embrace a position which is close to, though not completely identical with 
Natural Realism15. 
 
The most characteristic feature of Natural Realism is that a person living within the spirit of  
Natural Realism is convinced, without a need of decision, that he or she perceives and 
understands something real, i.e. independent of him or her. In doing so, he or she 
becomes aware of the own perceiving and thinking. Therefore, a natural realist is also 
convinced, explicitly or implicitly, that he or she does not primarily perceive own 
perceptions of the senses and does not primarily think own thoughts. He does not need to 
fabricate representations of what he thinks might stand behind his perceptions and 
thoughts – the “outer world” -. A natural realist is in intimate contact with what he comes to 
call reality, based precisely on that contact. 
 
Summing up: From what has been said about Physics and Natural Realism, it follows that 
the mindset of Physics and the mindset of Natural Realism are distant from each other like 
models of natural processes are distant from the same processes as perceived by an 
observer. However, the situation becomes complicated insofar models have their place in 
Natural Realism, if they serve a practical or technological goal, while they have no place at 
 
14 Dummett, Michael, The Interpretation of Frege’s Philosophy, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass., 1981, p. 39 
15 Hartmann, Nicolai, Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis. 1965 (appeared first in 1921), chapter 13: ’Natürlicher 
Realismus’, p. 133-134 (first and second paragraph) and p. 134-135 (third paragraph). 
all in Natural Realism, if they are meant to mentally replace the perceived or experienced 
reality. Both aspects are not completely separable, which makes that the mindsets or 
intellectual climates of Physics and Natural Realism are at odds in principle, albeit to a 
variable degree, depending on whether a particular topic is more practical or more 
theoretical. 
 
THEOLOGY. Except the short remarks in the introduction, no reference has been made so 
far to the question of whether and how the lack of harmony between the epistemological 
climate of Physics and that of Natural Realism has an effect on a professional of physics, 
who happens to be a Christian. The core of the following considerations is that Christian 
revelation backs up Natural Realism. Therefore, if Physics is at odds with Natural Realism, 
it is also at odds with all that backs up Natural Realism, and with Christian revelation in  
particular. The following considerations try to explain why and how Christian revelation 
backs up Natural Realism. 
 
Christian revelation and, thus, Christian Theology focuses on God and on man and the 
world with respect to their relationship to God. That means before anything else, that man 
and the world are created by God, and it belongs to Theology to make it explicit that 
Creation is an exclusive action of God and how creatures are oriented intrinsically towards 
their Creator. From this point of view, Theology also speaks about the very same material 
things, which Natural Realism and Physics are dealing with. Natural Realism does it in a 
way that is called philosophical, and Physics in a way marked by the concept of laws of 
nature. In other words, Theology, Natural Realism and Physics have a common object, 
which they deal with in qualitatively different ways. 
 
From the perspective of Theology, Natural Realism and Physics are kinds of knowledge of 
certain created things. Such knowledges are obtained by humans, i.e. other creatures, by 
their own cognitive capacities. Theology, in turn, is a knowledge, “hosted” by human 
creatures as Philosophy and Physics, but essentially based on the Creator’s revelation. It 
refers to both the Creator and His creatures, in particular, to material things. Therefore, the 
theological knowledge about the common object (material things) is not only qualitatively 
different from the knowledge acquired by Natural Realism and that acquired by Physics, 
but it differs also with respect to its source. 
 
Notwithstanding the qualitative differences between these fields of knowledge, there must 
be a certain harmony between them, simply based on that they concern the very same 
objects. This argument obtains its genuine power by taking into account that it is the very 
same Creator, who has created everything as parts of a unique design. Theology has, in 
virtue of the Creator as its infallible source, a sort of “leading position”. Nevertheless, other 
domains of knowledge, as in our case Philosophy and Physics, could be at odds with the 
theological knowledge of material things. Precisely this is what has happened. Obviously, 
this is a source of difficulties for the dialogue between theology and natural sciences. 
 
What actually happens when a purely human area of knowledge of some objects is at 
odds with theological insights with respect to the same objects? ‘To be at odds’ denotes a 
situation, where is no contradictory opposition, but a more or less monstrous contrast. If 
one takes into account that the source of theological knowledge is the Judeo-Christian 
revelation, which stems from God and shows up in history, tradition and the Bible. God 
cannot err, but Christian revelation must be distinguished from theology that investigates 
revelation. 
 
Taking into account that the Magisterium of the Church is the immediate source of 
Theology, God’s infallibility reaches Theology not only through the infallible revelation, bu t 
also through the Church. Therefore, the conclusion is likely to be that a possible being at 
odds is rather due to the purely human realm of knowledge than to human imperfection in 
doing theology. That, in turn, suggests that it is rather the human area of knowledge in 
question that is suffering from some kind of deficiency. Indeed, the above remarks about 
reductionisms, in the particular case of physics, support precisely this idea. As a result, 
section IV will focus precisely on such deficiencies or reductionisms. 
 
Although theological insight and purely human areas of knowledge cannot contradict each  
other in the strict sense, because they differ in subject matter and method, it must be 
made explicit what kind of harmony is to be expected, which goes beyond non-
incompatibility. There is no need to have a literal correspondence on certain questions like 
the age of the earth, certain details of the beginning of the universe or the Flood. Of 
course, revelation does not contradict such facts, but the Bible is a means of divine 
revelation with the goal of salvation and, therefore, differs from a scientific protocol. 
 
The harmony should therefore be more fundamental than consist of just an agreement of 
single facts. Indeed, there is a hint of such a more fundamental harmony: it derives from 
that the Bible is written in ordinary language rather than in a particular language construed 
for that purpose. Ordinary language expresses an ordinary, that is, an immediate 
relationship to reality in which every healthy person in normal circumstances grows up 
from his or her infancy. This common ground between God's revelation and the normal 
world can hardly be overestimated. 
 
The biblical text also contains notions such as God, creator, created, image (Gen 1:26.27), 
soul, angel, bread of life, living bread, Holy Spirit, Father, and many others. They are 
anything but foreign bodies in a living organism. Rather they are semantically and 
inseparably interwoven with the surrounding text. Much more: on every page the mystery 
of God shines through in an inexpressible way. In addition, there is the analogous meaning 
of material things for the kingdom of heaven (for example the pearl, the treasure, etc., cf. 
Mt 13) and also, for example, the sacramental meaning of water in baptism. There is thus 
a kind of intimate mutual presence of natural and biblical-theological language and reality. 
 
All of this is an expression of the fact that God has revealed himself. The Old Testament 
precedes the self-revelation of God through His Son (Heb 1:2), and the New Testament 
follows this self-revelation, which was already prepared in the Old Testament (cf. Lk 24:27; 
Jo 5:39). And the son justifies his friendship with the apostles by alleging that he has told 
them everything that he has received from the Father (cf. Jo 15:15; Mt 11:25). And the Son 
promises the assistance of the Holy Spirit, the Spirit of truth, who will remind them of all 
that he has told them (cf. Jo 14:17; 15:26.27; 16:13). The Triune God is the God of truth, 
communication and transparency. 
 
These considerations make it clear that Christian theology and Natural Realism are 
profoundly related in terms of the intelligibility of their common object. Once again: the God 
of Christian revelation is the God of truth and thus of insight from within. Colloquial 
language and Natural Realism as the associated philosophical position also state that 
natural things are intrinsically intelligible. This is why Natural Realism extends so deeply 
into all purely human areas of knowledge that it cannot be abandoned, for example by 
constructing an artificial language. Because this in turn would have to start from something 
that is not artificial. 
 
Conclusion: Altogether, there exists a most intimate co-presence of natural language an d 
reality and biblical-theological language and reality. Both are inseparable from each  other. 
Nonetheless, natural language and natural reality on the one hand and biblical-theological 
language and reality on the other hand are not identical. 
 
Notice that intelligibility is directly inherent in the objects of the domain of knowledge in 
question. At the same time, however, the term "intelligibility" refers indirectly to the mind 
that "houses" the knowledge in question: the mind can have an insight into the object, 
because the object is intelligible. All these are insights of Natural Realism. 
 
Altogether, the considerations of the first part of this section  II yield that Physics does not 
harmonize with Natural Realism, although the latter remains somehow present in the 
former. In contrast, Natural Realism is in harmony with Christian theology. 
 
This provides an answer to the question posed at the beginning of the subsection 
"Theology", namely whether and how the lack of harmony between the epistemological 
climates or mindsets of Physics and Natural Realism affects a physicist, if he or she 
happens to be also a Christian. It does have an effect, which is that Christian revelation 
corroborates the gap existing in the same person’s mind between the epistemological 
mindsets of Physics and Natural Realism. This is rather detrimental for the person and, 
additionally, severely limits the possibilities of dialogue. 
 
* 
 
Before dealing with the question of how to react to this finding, three pertinent statements 
of the Magisterium of the Catholic Church might be quoted for supporting the view of the 
relationship between Christian revelation and Natural Realism just proposed. The first 
statement stems from the Encyclical Fides et ratio (FR, 1998) by Pope John Paul II. In the 
final part of this document, the Pope encourages scientists, to do their science within a 
“sapiential horizon” (FR 106,2). While it is not made explicit in that passage, what precisely 
this sapiential horizon is, it is clear that natural sciences are situated within such a horizon, 
which excludes the alternative that natural sciences themselves constitute such a 
sapiential horizon. 
 
Now, the text of Fides et ratio as a whole presents a positive view of the human capacity of 
insight, which means above all other things a metaphysical knowledge, and a metaphysics 
of being. It is worthwhile noting that Fides et ratio uses the term ‘metaphysics of being’ and 
its equivalents 23 times16. This is why scholars have qualified this Encyclical as the first 
document of the Magisterium that does not only recommend that philosophers and 
theologians draw their leading ideas from a realist philosophy (and theology) in general 
and that of Thomas Aquinas in particular but, specifically, by a realist metaphysics17. 
 
16 Knasas, John F.X., "Fides et Ratio" and the Twentieth Century Thomistic Revival . in: New Blackfriars, Vol. 81, No. 955 
(September 2000), pp. 400-408. see also: John Knasas on Thomist Metaphysics: Past, Present and Future, 
https://www.innerexplorations.com/philtext/john.htm. 
17 Fides et ratio contains more specifications so that one can say that The Church Does Have a Philosophy of He r Own , 
as a scholar (Alan Vincelette) puts it as a title of an article with the subtitle ”Ruminations on Fides et Ratio and the First 
Principles of Catholic Philosophy”. Bogoslovni Vestnik (Theological Quarterly) 73 (2013) 1, 17-46 (Faculty of Theology of  
Therefore, it can be concluded that Natural Realism is the main piece of the sapiential 
horizon mentioned in FR 106,2. In other words, it is Natural Realism that should be the 
philosophical frame for the natural sciences. As we have seen, this is not the case, at 
present. 
 
The second magisterial statement consists of three passages taken from the address of 
Pope John Paul II on 23.4.1993, shortly after the publication, by the Pontifical Biblical 
Commission, of the document The Interpretation of the Bible in the Church. One of the 
main ideas of the address is the “harmony between Catholic exegesis and the Mystery of 
Incarnation“ (section  2). Among the passages relevant for the relationship between 
Theology and Natural Realism are, above all, the following three. In these passages, the 
expression ’human language’ should be understood as parallel to ’Natural Realism’: 
 
”The God of the Bible is not an absolute Being who, crushing everything he touches, would 
suppress all differences and all nuances. On the contrary, he is God the Creator, who 
created the astonishing variety of beings “each according to its kind”, as the Genesis account 
says repeatedly (Gen 1). Far from destroying differences, God respects them and makes use 
of them (cf. 1 Cor 12:18.24.28). Although he expresses himself in human language he does 
not give each expression a uniform value, but uses its possible nuances with extreme 
flexibility and likewise respects its limitations. … None of the human aspects of language can 
be neglected.” (no. 8)  
 
and. on the other hand: 
 
“The Sacred Books cannot be likened to ordinary writings, but, since they have been dictated 
by the Holy Spirit himself and have extremely serious contents, mysterious and difficult in 
many respects, we always need, in order to understand and explain them, the coming of the 
same Holy Spirit, that is, his light and grace, which must certainly be sought in humble prayer 
and preserved by a life of holiness”. (no. 9)18 
 
These statements acquire their full weight by the parallelism between that the Son of God 
has become man, on the one hand, and that God’s revelation is expressed in human 
language, on the other. This is how John Paul II puts it in the same address (no. 6): 
 
“The strict relationship uniting the inspired biblical texts with the mystery of the incarnation 
was expressed by the Encyclical Divino afflante Spiritu in the following terms: “Just as the 
substantial Word of God became like man in every respect except sin, so too the words of 
God, expressed in human languages, became like human language in every respect except 
error“ (EB, 559). Repeated almost literally by the Conciliar Constitution Dei Verbum (13), this 
statement sheds light on a parallelism rich in meaning.“ 
 
The third statement is more specifically Catholic, too, for it concerns the assertion that a 
natural theology is possible. The formulation of the First Vatican Council’s Dogmatic 
Constitution Dei Filius is short: “The … Church holds and teaches that God, the beginn ing 
and end of all things, can be known with certitude by the natural light of human reason 
from created things, “for the invisible things of him, from the creation of the world, are 
 
the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia). The author mentions twelve first principles, in particular 1. Foundational Empirism  
(Experience is the foundation of philosophical knowledge), 3. Epistemological Realism (Correspondence Theory of  the  
Truth) and 7. Natural Theology (Metaphysics is Prior to Science). 
18 Address of His Holiness John Paul II on the Interpretation of the Bible in the Church, on April 23rd 1993, con occasion 
of the publication (15.4.1993), by the Pontifical Biblical Commission, of the Document The Interpretation of the Bible in 
the Church. 
clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made” (Rom 1:20).”19. This sober 
assertion can be circumscribed in a somewhat narrative manner by saying that Christian 
Revelation gives to understand that it is possible that a healthy person, who has got 
normally developed cognitive capacities, but lacks even the faintest idea about 
Christianity, is able to come, by his or her own intellectual resources, to the following 
insight: it is adequate to shape a proper concept for expressing the innermost state of the 
things of this world. If that person would encounter later the real Christianity, it would 
become clear to him or her that that new concept is equivalent to ‘creation’ or ‘create’, and 
that the inference to the existence of a Creator is true. It must be specified that the Church  
does not say that the possibility has or will become reality. It is rather a statement about 
the harmony between our world’s being created and its intrinsic intelligibility, on the one 
hand, and the human mind’s cognitive capacities, on the other. 
 
Most probably, theologians like Karl Barth would deny the possibility of such a natural 
theology. We need not go into details here, because we are not concerned with natural 
theology. But the Catholic position somehow supports what has been said so far about th e 
should be-relationship between Christian Theology, Natural Realism and Physics. Such  a 
corroboration goes like this: the possibility of a natural theology allows the conclusion th at 
the laws of nature are not necessarily a product of the model maker’s genius, but might 
well stem from just those material things the behaviour of which they describe. This does 
not exclude a contribution of the model maker’s genius, but it is not the essential part. 
 
It is as if Christian revelation said: “it is almost “forbidden” to use the Bible as a source of 
scientific information. It is as if Christian revelation gave to understand: “Scientists, trust 
your eyes and your mind! Through them you are in contact with reality! For that precise 
purpose you have got them!” It encourages somehow to not ultimately rely on 
reductionisms, but to trust that the full material reality will disclose itself to the human mind. 
This corroborates a mindset that tries to assimilate that reality, rather than to intervene by 
introducing reductionisms. Others than Christians do not know that, and they more easily 
assimilate less critically the intellectual climate which they are born into. In other words: 
while the Christian revelation has very little to offer with respect to the particularities of the 
laws of nature, it has very much to offer with respect to the intelligibility of the things of th is 
world and the human mind’s cognitive capacities. 
 
* 
 
Now the conclusion can be continued that has begun before the references to the 
Church ’s Magisterium. Taking both sections I and II together, one can say that: First, 
present day Physics essentially involves models for prediction, at the cost of making 
severe reductionisms. Models and reductionisms are bound together by the requirement of  
success, but they reduce the intelligibility of the processes investigated. This has led 
physicists to be rather skeptical about the intelligibility of material things. Second, Natural 
Realism tries to avoid all sort of reductionisms in order to do justice to the “original” reality. 
Third, Christian theology supports Natural Realism by asserting the intelligibility of 
material things and the human mind’s capacity of insight. Therefore, the “intellectual 
climates or mindsets” of physics, on the one hand, and of Natural Realism and Catholic 
Theology, on the other, do not match. This situation is not at all satisfactory and attempts 
to amend it are more than desirable. 
 
19 cf. 1st Vatican Council, Dogmatic Constitution Dei Filius, Chapter 2 (De Revelatione). Cf. DH 3004. 
 
It goes without saying that the intelligibility of material things plays a decisive role when it 
comes to compare Theology, Natural Realism and Physics taken as domains of 
knowledge. Unfortunately, the relationship between the knowledge of something and the 
intelligibility of that object of knowledge does not play any role in the pertinent public 
discussions. Instead, it focusses on particular issues such as the age of the Universe, the 
beginning and development of the Universe, the age and development of the Earth and 
the historicity of the Flood. Admittedly, the mentioned relationship is a difficult 
philosophical topic. But as intelligibility is inherent to any reality whatsoever that can be 
known by a human mind, its marginalization would foster rather an idealistic than a 
realistic mindset. Therefore, it would be appropriate to re-orientate the discussion about 
the relationship between Physics and Theology. 
 
But before these problems can be properly addressed, it is necessary to make sure that 
both Physics and Theology refer to the same object without reductionisms and with a 
common view of the object’s intelligibility. Obviously, this would require a Physics without 
reductionisms. This would most probably put in quarantine the true successes of Physics, 
which is not really desirable. Instead, one could envisage a Physics equipped with a sort of 
control of the losses of knowledge caused by the reductionisms. Such a control would 
have to be performed in such a way that the reductionisms are absent from the very 
outset. This possibility offers a new assessment of the curious fact that Theology is urged 
to assimilate scientific ways of thinking. As this sort of pressure on Theology is not any 
longer a minor phenomenon, we will briefly address it in the following section III, before we 
return to some details of the idea of enriching Physics in section IV. 
 
 
III. The pressure on Theology 
 
In order to substantiate the claim insinuated in this section’s title, we essentially present 
some quotations from different authors. Although the phenomenon involves all natural 
sciences, we limit ourselves to quotations related to Physics. These quotations are so 
eloquent that, for our purposes, a detailed evaluation seems to be unnecessary. Taken 
together, they give to understand that Christian Theology and Physics do not only relate to 
each other in an unharmonious way, but that there is a sort of pressure in order to get 
Theology adapted to the mindset of Physics. 
 
In fact, one finds countless publications with titles that express in one or other way the 
thesis that the intellectual climate of natural science should enter Theology. Take, for 
instance, the title The Hidden Face of God. Science Reveals the Ultimate Truth20. A major 
title in this context is A Scientific Theology in three volumes that are dedicated to, 
respectively, ‘Nature’, ‘Reality’ and ‘Theory’. Its author is the Anglican theologian and 
former biophysicist Alister McGrath21. It is not a textbook of dogmatic or moral theology, 
but it presents an attempt of bringing together both natural sciences and theology. As the 
cover text explains, “the first volume sets out a vision for a “scientific theology” in which the 
working assumptions of the natural sciences are critically appropriated as a theological 
resource” (italics mine). But obviously, making working assumptions is an essential part of  
the mindset of scientists, much less – if at all – of theologians. The cover text continues: 
 
20 Schroeder, Gerald, Free Press (now Simno & Schuster, New York, 2002. 
21 Mc Grath, Alister, A Scientific Theology, Eerdmans Publishers, Grand Rapid, Michigan, 2001-2003. 
“[A]s a whole, A Scientific Theology is the most extended and systematic exploration of the 
relation between Christian theology and the natural sciences ever undertaken”. 
 
Another sort of attempt to seek harmony between Physics and Theology consists in the 
view that object and method of Theology are such that it could contribute to the solution  of 
problems, which (to date) have not, or not completely, been solved by Physics. This 
stance leads to problem settings like the following: 
 
”We investigate the problem whether physics – which is understood here as the most general 
and most abstract field in science – can lead to questions which cannot be answered within 
the methodological framework of physics alone and which could perhaps be answered in the 
context of theology. Many prominent scientists of the 20th century, e.g. Einstein, Jordan, 
Weinberg, and Hawking have seriously discussed this conjecture. 
 
The question whether physics leads to problems which cannot be solved by means of 
physics alone will be investigated here first for classical mechanics, in particular with respect 
to the problem of a complete determinism in the sense of Laplace and its refutation in the 
20th century. Second we discuss quantum mechanics with respect to the uncertainty relation, 
the problem of objectification and the complete loss of classical determinism and its 
replacement by statistical causality. Third we consider relativity, in particular relativistic 
quantum cosmology. Here we are confronted with the problem of the origin of the universe, 
the big bang and the problem of the creatio ex nihilo. It was argued very often by physicists 
and philosophers of science that for a complete explanation of this process a creator of the 
universe must be presupposed. 
 
We will treat these problems on three different levels. First on the level of single phenomena 
we raise the question whether there are individual events which violate well confirmed laws 
of nature. Second on the level of mathematically formulated theories like classical mechanics 
or quantum mechanics we argue that the violation of a single law could violate the entire 
theory. Third on the very abstract level of laws of nature we ask why the well-known laws 
hold in nature and not alternative ones. On each level we ask whether there are problems 
which cannot be solved by means of physics alone and which offer perhaps the possibility of 
a theological explanation.”22. 
 
There are certainly more ways of combining, if not conflating both branches of knowledge. 
On the other hand, there has also been proposed a solution to avoid possible conflicts 
from the outset. It is the idea of NOMA (= non overlapping magisteria) proposed by the 
evolutionary biologist and historian of science Stephen Jay Gould (1941-2002): 
 
“The net of science covers the empirical universe: what is it made of (fact) and why does it 
work this way (theory). The net of religion extends over questions of moral meaning and 
value. These two magisteria do not overlap, nor do they encompass all inquiry (consider, for 
starters, the magisterium of art and the meaning of beauty). To cite the arch cliches, we get 
the age of rocks, and religion retains the rock of ages; we study how the heavens go, and 
they determine how to go to heaven”23. 
 
 
22 Mittelstaedt, Peter, On Possible Relations between Physics and Theology, in: W. Löffler and P. Weingartner (eds.), 
‘Knowledge and Belief’. Proceedings of the 26th International Wittgenstein Symposium, 2003, öbv & hpt, Wien (2004), p . 
329-338, Abstract. 
23 http://www.stephenjaygould.org/library/gould_noma.html. cf. also: Gould, Stephen Jay, Rocks of Ages. Science and 
Religion in the Fullness of Life. New York, Ballentine Books, 2002. 
But theology is not only, and not primarly, about moral meaning and value but, above all, 
about God and His providence for the entire creation including salvation and eternal life. 
NOMA would deprive God from giving things the laws of nature He esteems convenient. 
That is to say, NOMA would empty the concept of creation reducing it to mere ‘existence’. 
That would be a heavy intervention of Science in Theology, which is precisely what NOMA 
claims it has set out to avoid. 
 
Mixing of the mindset of the Natural Sciences with that of Theology, expecting answers 
from Theology to problems posed by Science, in particular Physics, and confining 
Theology to morals and meaning (NOMA), are three ways of influencing Theology from 
outside towards a direction different from that chosen by Theology itself. They are subtle 
forms of pressure motivated by the success of a Natural Science, and of Physics in 
particular. In fact, the success of Physics is true, but success is, above all, a practical 
category, meanwhile truth is a theoretical one. 
 
Not enough with that. Some authors claim a sort of leadership of the Natural Sciences 
over Theology. This claim is first advanced by scientists. Here should be mentioned the 
view of Ian G. Barbour (1923-2013), who is praised by some people as one of the pioneers 
of the Science-Theology debate. He was a physicist and became later a protestant 
theologian: 
 
”[Here] science and Religion are considered to be relatively independent sources of ideas, 
but with some areas of overlap in their concerns. In particular, the doctrines of creation and 
human nature are affected by the findings of science. If religious beliefs are to be in harmony 
with scientific knowledge, more extensive adjustments or modifications are called for than 
those introduced by proponents of the Dialogue thesis. It is said that the theologian should 
draw from broad features of science that are widely accepted, rather than risk adapting to 
limited or speculative theories that are more likely to be abandoned in the future. Theological 
doctrines must be consistent with the scientific evidence even if they are not directly implied 
by current scientific theories”. 
 
“God is not the transcendent Sovereign of classical Christianity. God interacts reciprocally 
with the world, an influence on all events though never the sole cause of any event”. 24 
 
Surprisingly, the idea of the role of natural science as a “light house” for theology is 
supported by theologians, too. This might be substantiated by two quotations; one from the 
reformed protestant theologian Thomas F. Torrance (1913-2007), the other from the well 
known Lutheran theologian Wolfhart Pannenberg (1928-2014). First, Torrance with a 
passage from the General Introduction that appears in every volume of a series initiated by 
him: 
 
“We must now reckon with a revolutionary change in the generation of fundamental ideas. 
Today it is no longer philosophy but the physical and natural sciences which set the pace in 
human culture through their astonishing revelation of the relational structures that pervade 
and underlie all created reality. At the same time, as our science presses its inquiries to the 
very boundaries of being, in macrophysical and microphysical dimensions alike, there is 
 
24 Barbour, Ian G., When Science meets Religion. Enemies, Strangers or Partners? HarperCollins Publishers LLC, New 
York 2000, both quotations p.35. 
being brought to light a hidden traffic between theological and scientific ideas of the most far-
reaching significance for both theology and science”.25 
 
The ideas expressed in that paragraph are neither a marginal nor an isolated 
phenomenon. Torrance is one of the 97 foundational members of the International Society 
for Science and Religion (2001; www.issr.org.uk), the founding president of which is the 
theoretical physicist and later Anglican pastor John Polkinghorne, Cambridge (UK). Other 
similar institutions are the Center for Theology and Natural Sciences (Berkeley, California, 
www.ctns.org), the John Templeton Foundation (West Conshohocken, PA, USA, 
www.templeton,org), the Michael Faraday Institute for Science and Religion (Cambridge 
(UK), www.faraday-institute.org), the Ian Ramsey Centre for Science and Religion (Oxford 
(UK), www.ianramseycentre.info), the European Society for the Study of Science and 
Theology (ESSSAT, www.esssat.net), the Zygon Center for Religion and Science 
(Chicago, www.zygoncenter.org). These and several others, of different background, are 
listed in the Interdisciplinary Encyclopedia of Religion and Science (Rome, 
www.inters.org/websites). 
 
Torrance’s stance is motivated by theological considerations which we need not examine 
here. Pannenberg’s theological views may differ from Torrance’s but, for a certain period 
of his life, he seems to have supported Torrance’s idea of introducing into Theology the 
concept of ’field’, which certainly occupies a central position in modern Physics: 
 
"To Th. F. Torrance belongs the merit to have called attention - perhaps as the first - to these 
connections and to have pleaded for introducing the concept of field into theology: 'the field 
that we are concerned with is surely the interaction of God with history understood from the 
axis of Creation - Incarnation. ... Our understanding of this field will be determined by the 
force or energy that constitutes it, the Holy and Creator Spirit of God.'".26 
 
Pannenberg dedicates to the topic of the relationship between Theology and the Natural 
Sciences, in particular Physics, at least 26 of his 744 publications. Except one or two 
previous publications, the first ones appear in the beginning of the 80’s and reach their 
zenit in the 90’s27. Thus, one may conclude that the relationship between Theology and 
the Natural Sciences was for him an ”important secondary topic“. A sample of 
Pannenberg’s terminology in dealing with the concept of field is the following quotation 
(page numbers refer to volume I of his Systematische Theologie): 
 
"The assertion that the turning of modern Physics to field theories of ever more natural 
phenomena has an implicit theological relevance is suggested by the metaphysical origin of 
the concept of field. The idea of a field of forces can be traced through the Stoa back to the 
presocratics. (p.101) ... Insofar as the concept of field corresponds to the old doctrines of 
 
25 General Introduction to the series ’Theology and Science at the Frontiers of Knowledge’ initiated by Torrance, Scottish 
Academic Press, Edinburgh, 1989. 
26 Pannenberg, Wolfhart, Systematische Theologie, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, I, 1988, S. 102, Anm. 212; 
inner quotation from: Th.F.Torrance, Space, Time and Incarnation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1969, p. 71 
27 Cf. Dienstbeck, Stefan, Bibliographie der Veröffentlichungen von Wolfhart Pannenberg 1953-2009 (online, without 
year). This bibliography has the following publications on the topic of the relationship between Theology and the Natura l  
Sciences: Nr. 200, Wissenschaftstheorie und Theologie (1973), 267, 320 (1980) 342, 344, 360 (1983), 395, 414 (1986), 
423, 426, 452 (1989), 454 (Theological Appropriation of Scientific Understandings, 1989), 470, 500 (Theology and 
Science, 1992), 522, 544 (Theology of Cration and Natural Science, 1995), 548, 549, 570 (1996), 581, 582, 584, 612 
(1998), 657 (2001), 700 (2004), 715 (2006). Some particularly signif icant titles are mentioned explicitly. Translations, 
above all into English and Spanish, are counted extra. 
pneuma [spirit], it is not at all nonsensical, but rather suggested by the history of concepts 
and mind, to put into relation the field theories of modern Physics with the Christian doctrine 
of the dynamical operations of the divine pneuma in the creation." (p.102). ... "As a matter of 
fact, such reasons for introducing the concept of field into theology have taken place in the 
framework of the doctrine about God, namely linked to the interpretation of the traditional 
way of speaking about God as about a Spirit." (p.104). 28 
 
It goes without saying that, for a Christian, such views as those formulated by Barbour, 
Torrance and Pannenberg are simply unacceptable. The most important reason for it is 
that Theology develops in a homogeneous way, because it is based on God-given 
revelations, and God does neither err nor change over time. Physics, in turn, as any 
human science, is based on human experience and reason, and these capacities are 
subject to the possibility of error and change. As is well known, Physics has experienced 
several “paradigm shifts”. 
 
As a conclusion from this section III, it can be stated that these quotations may be 
sufficient to show that there does exist a pressure on theology, stemming from the natural 
sciences. We have limited ourselves to Physics, but also Biology and Chemistry contribute 
to that pressure. It is hardly deniable that the omnipresent, though not always mentioned 
motive is the success of the natural sciences. More precisely, it is not these doctrines 
themselves which act upon each other, but human persons, theologians and scientists, 
which have a personal stance with respect to both doctrines and exercise their influence 
on other scientists and theologians. That interaction between theologians and scientists 
influences heavily the mindset of the general public. Everybody faces that pressure in 
everyday’s life, sometimes become aware of it in his or her own way of thinking, and 
witnesses it in the mindset of almost everybody else. 
 
How can Theology defend itself against this pressure? Operating with the category of 
‘success’ would not be a good solution. Examining the pertinent bodies of doctrine meets 
the difficulty that theologians are not competent to criticize a physicist’s professional work, 
as well as physicists are not competent to criticize a theologians professional work. Yet, in 
the light of what has been said about the reductionisms in Physics in section II, a 
theologian may state that there is no common object of dialogue, because theologians do 
not perform any reductionisms where physicists do. In order to establish a dialogue at all, 
there must be, at least, a certain account for the cognitive losses caused by the 
reductionisms in Physics, as has already been envisaged at the end of section II. In other 
words, instead of a Theology being in need of changes, Physics turns out to be in  need of 
a flanking aide that control its cognitive losses through its methodical reductionisms. So, i t 
turns out that it is Physics, which should become a “site under construction”, and not 
Theology. 
 
 
IV. On the defence of Theology by providing a 
control of the cognitive losses of Physics 
 
In this final section we do not present an elaboration of a control of the cognitive losses of 
Physics, which arise from its methodical reductionisms. This is a major task that cannot 
dispatched with on a few pages. But we pretend to somehow prepare the ground for such 
 
28 Cf. Pannenberg’s later article Geist als Feld – nur eine Metapher?, in: Theologie und Philosophie 71 (1996). 257-260. 
In the Bibliographie der Veröffentlichungen von W.P. …, this article has the number 570. 
an elaboration and add also some remarks concerning the conditions to be met for 
fruitfully working in such a project. First of all, the control envisaged at the end of the 
previous section should take place neither in theological terms nor in terms of physico-
mathematical theories, but in the spirit of philosophical Natural Realism. However, that 
does not make it impossible that the specific intelligibility of material things leads the 
philosophical reflection into areas closer to both Mathematics and Theology. 
 
One might wonder whether the harmonization of the present epistemological climates 
found in Physics and Christian Theology envisaged in section II would also contribute to 
the control of the cognitive losses of Physics. The reason is simply that, according to 
section II, the reductionisms in Physics go hand in hand with a low intelligibility of material 
things, while the absence of such reductionisms goes hand in hand with a high intelligibility 
of material things. And ‘intelligibility’ is just another word for ‘epistemological climate’. 
Therefore, the starting point of elaborating the envisaged control consists in not performing 
the known reductionisms in Physics from the very outset. The only source of insight is, 
then, the common experience of our material world giving rise to the task of reflecting on 
this experience in order to extract further insights. 
 
The considerations of sections II and III make it quite clear that elaborating a control 
cannot limit itself to minor re-arrangements, so to speak, to tactical manoeuvres. It must 
reach the very foundations. In other words, it must be, so to speak, a strategical 
manoeuvre. Such a manoeuvre should fulfill the two following basic criteria already 
mentioned in the final part of section III: 
 
(i) Physics depends on the severe systematic reductionisms sketched in section II, while 
Theology has no such voluntarily made reductionisms. 
 
(ii) Theology can grow, but only in a way that posterior stages are fully consistent with all 
previous ones. The reason is that a theologians understanding of God’s revelation can grow, 
but God is always identical with Himself. In contrast, Physics has already undergone several 
major changes “of paradigm” [the last two: determinism/indeterminism (quantum theory), and 
the constancy of the speed of light and the equivalence of inert and heavy mass as 
configurating the relativity of observer and observed (theories of relativity)]. Therefore, there 
is no problem at all if Physics would change once more. 
 
In other words, Physics is envisaged to undergo another change of paradigm, namely the 
change from doing Physics after the reductionisms without any control or estimate of the 
losses due to the reductionisms, to doing Physics after the reductionisms, but in the light of 
a control or estimate of the losses due to the reductionisms. With all certainty, the control 
would exercise a pressure on Physics, but a pressure that stems from inside Physics. It 
remains to be seen, whether a Physics with an estimate of the cognitive losses would 
continue exercising undue pressures upon Theology. 
 
Further considerations about how a control or estimate of the losses caused by the 
reductionisms of Physics could be established, do not belong to our topic. Some ideas for 
elaborating such a control have been published elsewhere29. It goes without saying that 
 
29 Some ideas about how to settle the approach and what sort of results can be expected is offered in two articles of 
mine: Does Physics need a Second Scientific Revolution? Christianity Encourages Tackling a Foundational Problem of 
Physics. International Journal of Sino-Western Studies, vol. 4, 2013, pp. 95-116, and Substance and Dynamics: Two 
Elements of Aristotelian-Thomistic Philosophy of Nature in the Foundation of Mathematics in Physics . Studia Gilsoniana 
6:3 (2017), pp. 451-483. 
this a task does not belong to any Church ’s mission, but rather to competent professionals. 
However, given the typical uncertainties of an innovative approach to the solution of a 
difficult problem, the number of such professionals, who in fact would dedicate years and 
even decades to its solution, is quite reduced. 
 
A final remark goes to to the persons who are familiar with the way of thinking of both 
Physics and Theology. Christians who happen to be physicists will feel both the difference 
of epistemological climates and the pressure upon Theology in a more intense way, 
because difference and pressure stem from their own professional environment. Still more: 
if a physicist wants to be professionally competitive, he or she must work according to the 
present-day standards of Physics and, in so doing, somehow interiorize the disharmony of 
epistemological climates or mindsets. Precisely by this, he or she contributes to perpetuate 
the spirit of the present standards of Physics, in him- or herself and in the professional 
environment30. 
 
It is true that this situation does not affect in equal degree every single physicist, but the 
basic situation is nevertheless the same for everybody: for a present day physicist, it is not 
so easy to be genuinely a Christian, because he or she is, on the one hand, burdened by 
the lack of harmony between the epistemological climates or mindsets of Physics and 
Natural Realism. In turn, Christian revelation “incorporates” somehow natural realism and 
therefore he or she is, on the other hand, exposed to an atmosphere of estrangement from 
and pressure upon Theology and Natural Realism to approach the mindset of Physics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extended Summary 
(short summary at the beginning) 
 
Natural Realism and Physics are two ways of  relating to our material world. This article provides 
some basic characteristics of  both and derives two joined reasons why Physics is, partially, at 
odds with Natural Realism. The f irst reason consists in that present-day Physics is based on 
models of  reality which involve several severe methodical reductionisms. From that derives the 
second reason, which is the dif ference of  epistemological climates of  Natural Realism and 
Physics. The dif ference is that the intelligibility of material things is esteemed low in Physics and  
high in Natural Realism. 
 
Natural Realism suggests that it should be possible to overcome that unsatisfactory state of  
af fairs. As a way to amend the relationship, it is suggested as a goal to elaborate a certain 
control or estimate of  the methodical losses of  Physics due to its reductionisms (as long as 
Physics does not change its method). This control is elaborated in the spirit of  Natural Realism. 
It is also expected to be helpful for achieving deeper insights within Physics. 
 
The results of  a Physics under reductionisms do not seem to harmonize with many data of fered 
by the Bible about certain material and historical facts. On the other hand, the Bible is not a 
scientific protocol or text book. Both the dif ferences between epistemological climates and 
 
30 This moral aspect depends from the opposite epistemological climates of Physics and Christian revelation. It is treated 
in more detail in an article of mine: On an Amendment of the Morality of a Physicist’s Professional Actions. An Element of 
Inculturation of Christianity into a Scientific-Technological Civilization. Rodczniki Teologczne, Tom LXVI, zeszyt 3 − 
2019, s. 51-67. 
between the presentation of  facts appear to bring about a sort of  pressure upon theologians to 
assimilate the scientif ic way of  understanding, because it is considered “successful”. 
 
Though this pressure is partly exercised by scientists and partly even by theologians, i.e. by 
persons, one root of  the pressure lies in the doctrines of  Physics and Natural Realism as such, 
above all in the dif f erence of  their epistemological climates. Making disappear the dif ference o f  
epistemological climates will, therefore, lower the pressure. A f irst step towards that goal is the 
investigation of  the consequences that emerge f rom renouncing of  the reductionisms of  
Physics. As the reductionisms are recognized as such in the spirit of  Natural Realism, any 
investigating the consequences of  renouncing of  them will equally take place in the spirit of  
Natural Realism. 
 
Christian revelation endorses Natural Realism, when speaking of  our material world. Thus, it 
turns out that the philosophical solution of  a problem of  Physics in the spirit of  Natural Realism 
has benef icial consequences also for the relationship of  Physics to Christian Theology, and to 
Christianity in general. It is a f lanking aid to the inculturation of  Christianity into a scientif ic-
technological civilization. 
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